Documentation GuidesZero-Trust prototype v1.0.0

Security & OCI Sandboxing

3-layer defense-in-depth isolation, host blocking middleware, and pluggable OCI runtime strategies.

Security & OCI Sandboxing

prototype enforces multi-layer isolation to prevent containerized workloads from accessing the host management control plane or local network services.

🛡️ 3-Layer Defense-in-Depth Model

Isolation is enforced across network boundaries, application HTTP middleware, and kernel capability controls.

Architecture Diagram

Rendering architecture diagram...

Layer	Threat Mitigated	Technical Enforcement
1. Network Boundary	Local LAN/WAN Scanning	Explicit `127.0.0.1` binding and null-routing `host.docker.internal:127.0.0.1` inside containers.
2. Host Middleware	REST API Tampering from Containers	`ContainerHostIsolationMiddleware` rejects requests originating from Docker bridge subnets (`172.16.0.0/12`).
3. Kernel Hardening	Privilege Escalation & Fork Bombs	Strips capabilities (`CapDrop: ALL`), enforces `no-new-privileges: true`, and applies Seccomp syscall filters.

📦 Pluggable OCI Runtime Strategies

Run workstations under standard Linux cgroups, user-space virtualized kernels, or hardware-isolated microVMs.

Runtime	Isolation Level	Memory Overhead	Best Suited For
`runc` (Default)	Linux Namespaces + cgroups v2	~0 MB (Native)	Daily development, VS Code, daily web coding
`runsc` (gVisor)	Intercepted User-Space Virtual Kernel	~15-30 MB	Untrusted script execution, dynamic analysis, zero-trust sandboxes
`kata-runtime`	Hardware QEMU / Cloud-Hypervisor MicroVM	~100 MB	Multi-tenant isolation with hardware hypervisor boundaries
`crun`	Fast C-Based Native OCI Runtime	Minimal	Low-latency microservices and batch workloads

Host Docker Daemon Registration

json

{
  "runtimes": {
    "runsc": {
      "path": "/usr/bin/runsc"
    },
    "kata-runtime": {
      "path": "/usr/bin/kata-runtime"
    },
    "crun": {
      "path": "/usr/bin/crun"
    }
  }
}

🔒 Kernel Capabilities & Safe Profile

Containers drop all capabilities by default, retaining only strictly unprivileged permissions necessary for desktop initialization:

yaml

# Default Hardened Capability Profile
cap_drop:
  - ALL
cap_add:
  - CHOWN
  - DAC_OVERRIDE
  - FOWNER
  - SETGID
  - SETUID
  - NET_BIND_SERVICE
  - KILL
security_opt:
  - no-new-privileges:true

Previous Workstations & Services

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